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Critical 9.8 Neos and Flow flaw allows unauthenticated file writes with a single POST request
A CVSS 9.8 flaw in the Flow framework lets unauthenticated visitors write arbitrary files into Neos CMS installations with one POST request. Patched releases exist for every maintained branch.
A security advisory published by the Neos project on 13 November 2026 assigns a flaw in the Flow PHP framework a CVSS score of 9.8, squarely in the critical band. Neos CMS is built on Flow, so the bug reaches every Neos deployment, and the advisory covers both. The capability it describes is stark: an unauthenticated visitor can drop arbitrary files into the public resources folder, Web/_Resources/Persistent, using a single POST request.
The upload lands before the policy check
According to Netics, which examined the advisory, the root cause is an ordering problem in Flow's request pipeline. The framework's documentation lists the default middleware chain in sequence: standards compliance, trusted proxies, session, AJAX widget, routing, the powered-by header, flash messages, body parsing, the security entry point, and dispatch. Body parsing sits at position eight, the security entry point at nine, and the dispatcher at ten.
That ordering means an uploaded file is processed and written to disk while the authorisation decision for the target action is still queued behind it. Flow's security layer intercepts dispatching before any controller runs and forms its decision around the intercepted method, but by then the request body has already been parsed and the resource already persisted. The lesson Netics draws is that authorisation bound to a controller action offers no protection for work the framework performs before that action is ever called.
Blocklist gaps widen the impact
A second weakness compounds the first. According to the GitHub advisory published alongside the Neos announcement (GHSA-7wrr-qcrp-4hhf), the list of forbidden file extensions did not cover .phar, .php7, .pht and .shtml. Each of those matters only where the server will execute it: on hosts that run scripts under Web/_Resources, the result is critical, while on others the attack still leaves files behind. The Apache case is called out separately — an uploaded .htaccess file can re-enable script execution the host had switched off, converting a directory-level configuration file into a bypass of an existing restriction.
Affected versions and the patches
The advisory covers most of the maintained tree: Flow up to and including 8.3.21, 8.4.0 through 8.4.6, 9.0.0 through 9.0.9, 9.1.0 through 9.1.4, and 9.2.0 through 9.2.2. Patched releases exist for every maintained branch — 8.3.22, 8.4.7, 9.0.10, 9.1.5 and 9.2.3. Anything up to Flow 8.2 is unmaintained and receives no fix, a point the advisory makes without softening.
What operators should do
The advisory prescribes two actions. The first is the update: run composer update neos/flow, then confirm with composer show neos/flow that the installed version matches one of the patched releases.
The second is an audit, because patching closes the hole but leaves behind anything already written. On disk, a find over Web/_Resources/Persistent that filters out symlinks and lists script-like extensions (.ph, .shtml, .cgi, .pl, .py) surfaces candidates. In the database, a select against neos_flow_resourcemanagement_persistentresource for filenames beginning with a dot or matching those extensions flags records that hint at an unauthenticated upload. Findings should be reviewed, then removed together with their records.
The longer-lasting part of the mitigation sits in web server configuration: never let PHP or any other script type execute below Web/_Resources. That shuts down the route to code execution on an unpatched install, on a host waiting for a change window, and against later bugs of this kind. The patched releases themselves make three changes, according to Netics: file extensions are checked on every kind of upload, newly created resources are discarded when a request fails, and the action policy is enforced before an error action is called.
Why it matters
An unauthenticated file write with a plausible route to script execution is functionally remote code execution, and a 9.8 score on software behind self-hosted CMS deployments sits near the ceiling of what a web vulnerability can be. The design lesson travels beyond Neos: middleware ordering is itself a security decision, even when no single middleware looks wrong. A body parser at position eight and an authorisation gate at position nine open a window in which an unauthorised request does real, persistent work before anyone asks whether it was allowed. Frameworks that handle uploads ahead of policy enforcement, or that gate uploads with a blocklist rather than an allowlist, deserve the same scrutiny. And the server-side rule recommended here — no script execution under upload directories — is the layer of defence that would have blunted this flaw even before a patch existed.
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- #flow-framework
- #security
- #php
- #vulnerability