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Debian fixed GPGME double-free on disclosure day; Ubuntu 24.04 still waiting
A double-free in GPGME (CVE-2026-129975), triggerable by a crafted OpenPGP key, was patched in Debian on disclosure day, while Ubuntu 24.04 had no fixed package two days later.

A double-free reachable from a crafted key
According to a dev.to write-up published on 22 November 2026, the GnuPG project announced CVE-2026-129975 (internal reference T8557) two days earlier, on 20 November, crediting Johan Carlsson with the discovery. Every GPGME release before 2.3.0 is affected, and version 2.3.1 carries the fix.
The defect sits in two internal routines that parse status lines and key listings returned by gpg. When a buffer has to grow, the code reallocates it but delays writing the new pointer back into its context until the function finishes. A read error that forces an early return leaves the context holding the previous pointer, and that memory is then released a second time. Reaching the faulty path requires a crafted OpenPGP key with an unusually long user ID.
The advisory's impact list is wider than GPGME's mail-client reputation suggests: Samba, most mail clients, and anything statically linked against an outdated copy of the library are all named.
Debian fixed both releases on disclosure day
Working in containers, the dev.to author compared what each distribution actually ships. Debian, which builds the same upstream source package (gpgme1.0), had fixes out on 20 November itself: DSA-6646-1 updated trixie to 1.24.2-3+deb13u1, and DLA-4924-1 updated bookworm, the older LTS release, to 1.18.0-3+deb12u1. The author had expected the LTS to trail current stable and found the opposite.
Ubuntu 24.04 (noble) told a different story. The container reported libgpgme11t64 at 1.18.0-4.1ubuntu4 as both the installed and candidate version, with nothing newer offered from the main or security pockets. Launchpad's publishing history for gpgme1.0 in noble showed the most recent upload dated 4 April 2024, before the bug existed, and no Ubuntu security notice had appeared at the time of writing. Anyone on noble counting on apt to deliver the fix had no fixed package to pull.
One subtlety the author stresses: upstream version numbers mislead in both directions. Bookworm's build still reads 1.18.0 yet contains the patch, because distributions fold security fixes into their own point releases. Noble's exposure is inferred not from its version string but from the total absence of a newer upload or advisory.
Normal signing is unaffected
The author also exercised the installed library through GPGME's Python bindings, deliberately avoiding the bare gpg command line, which does not pass through GPGME at all. Across five runs, detached signing and verification of an ordinary message each completed in under nine milliseconds, and every verification reported a valid signature. Only the specific malformed input walks into the double-free, so the practical risk concentrates in software that ingests untrusted key material: key import in mail clients, tooling that consumes keyserver listings, and Samba's use of the library.
For anyone unwilling to wait on a distribution upload, the official 2.3.1 tarball's published SHA-1 checksum matched the advisory in the author's check. A plan to time a manual build was dropped because the test machine refuses to compile downloaded tarballs outright, so no build-time figure exists.
How to check your own systems
The write-up's method translates directly to any Debian-derived machine: apt-cache policy libgpgme11t64 (or libgpgme11 on older releases) shows the installed and candidate builds, and an --only-upgrade install attempt confirms whether a fix has reached your mirrors yet. The article is a snapshot from 22 November, so Ubuntu's status may have changed since.
Why it matters
The episode shows how unevenly upstream fixes propagate. Upstream GPGME, Debian stable, and Debian LTS all closed the hole on disclosure day, while Ubuntu 24.04, a widely deployed LTS, had shipped nothing two days later. Users cannot judge their exposure from version numbers, since a patched 1.18.0 and a vulnerable 1.18.0 can coexist across distributions; only distribution advisories settle the question. The saving grace is that the bug requires crafted key material to trigger, so ordinary signing and verification stay safe — but every deployment that parses untrusted OpenPGP keys inherits the gap until an upload lands.
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