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Ghostscript Type 1 font use-after-free escapes -dSAFER sandbox, enabling pre-auth RCE
A use-after-free in Ghostscript's Type 1 font loader let crafted files escape the -dSAFER sandbox and run commands in the rendering process, hitting print, email and upload pipelines.

A font loader bug that breaks the sandbox
Security researchers at pwn.ai have documented a use-after-free flaw in Ghostscript's Type 1 font loader, now tracked as CVE-2026-125396 and named Upload2Shell by its finders. According to the published record, a crafted document can exploit the memory error to tamper with the interpreter's internal controls, escape the -dSAFER sandbox meant to confine rendering operations, and execute commands chosen by the attacker with the privileges of the rendering process.
That process is rarely a desktop app. Ghostscript, the long-standing PostScript and PDF interpreter, sits beneath print spoolers, email attachment previews, document management systems and thumbnail generators. pwn.ai's earlier ImageMagick research showed why file extensions are a poor defence: uploads named .png or .jpg can still be routed into Ghostscript when image tooling performs conversion.
Confirmed attack chains
The evidence index accompanying the disclosure lists the production systems where the chain was confirmed or traced:
- Debian 13 with CUPS: an unauthenticated IPP job submitted to a shared print queue ran commands on the host as the lp user.
- Roundcube: an outside sender's attachment was thumbnailed as soon as the recipient opened the message, with the payload executing as www-data through the ImageMagick delegate.
- Plesk Obsidian: the bundled Roundcube thumbnail path was affected the same way.
- WordPress core: the renderer was reachable for Author-level users and for Contributors granted the upload_files capability, while public upload fields in several plugins required no WordPress login at all. WordPress shipped a separate fix under CVE-2026-65640.
- Essential Addons for Elementor: unauthenticated command execution through a public registration widget with an upload field enabled.
- Forminator: unauthenticated command execution through a public PDF form that stored submissions in the WordPress Media Library.
- Mayan EDMS: execution in the worker chain when a configured document inbox imported and rendered an external email attachment.
- DokuWiki: execution through an open wiki's upload and resize path using its optional ImageMagick backend.
- MediaWiki: execution through the PdfHandler extension on a wiki configured for anonymous PDF uploads, reported to Wikimedia Security.
- ResourceSpace: execution in the preview worker, reachable through an authenticated upload or an upload-share capability.
- Google: a signed-out request for an attacker-hosted file reached Ghostscript inside Google's document rendering pipeline, and Google later mitigated that path.
Dropbox and two undisclosed services belong to the same research effort but stem from separate Ghostscript flaws, according to pwn.ai. A late-September teaser from the team additionally claimed the single zero-day had achieved pre-authentication code execution against a longer list including Box, Dropbox and Zoom, with case studies still pending.
Patches and identifiers
The researchers found the font-loader escape on 27 July 2026 and filed the root cause with Artifex as bug 709684 in early September. An upstream Ghostscript release followed within days and entered Debian unstable as version 10.08.0 on 12 September. Debian's first stable-security update for the flaw landed on 25 September, and the build now marked fixed, 10.05.1~dfsg-1+deb13u3, was published on 10 October.
Roundcube hardened attachment resizing on 19 October under CVE-2026-114727 by rejecting unsafe attachment image types before ImageMagick conversion. Ubuntu's USN-8949-1, published on 21 October, carried fixed packages across seven releases, including Ubuntu Pro and Legacy branches. The CVE identifier for the Ghostscript root was published on 9 November, Google closed its affected path on 10 November, and product-specific case studies and proof-of-concept code are being released on a rolling basis.
Why it matters
This is a clear demonstration that one memory-safety bug in a foundational library can turn supposedly harmless document rendering into pre-authentication remote code execution across printers, mail servers, wikis and CMS platforms. Two lessons stand out for operators. First, -dSAFER cannot be treated as a hard security boundary, because the sandbox and the code it confines live in the same process; a memory bug underneath it removes the boundary entirely. Second, restricting uploads to image extensions is not a defence when conversion tooling silently forwards files to Ghostscript. Any service that processes files from untrusted users should be running the fixed Ghostscript builds and the downstream patches for WordPress, Roundcube and Ubuntu, and, since pwn.ai's case studies are still appearing, should expect the list of confirmed entry points to keep growing.
- #security
- #ghostscript
- #vulnerability
- #image-processing