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· via Hacker News – Front Page (native)

IETF draft from Google, Apple and Cloudflare proposes Merkle Tree TLS certificates

A standards-track IETF draft from engineers at Google, Apple, Cloudflare and Geomys proposes Merkle Tree certificates, building Certificate Transparency-style public logging into X.509 to cut issuance and logging costs.

IETF draft from Google, Apple and Cloudflare proposes Merkle Tree TLS certificates

A standards-track IETF draft co-authored by engineers at Google, Apple, Cloudflare and Geomys proposes a new class of X.509 certificate with public logging built into the format itself, in a bid to cut the cost of issuing and auditing TLS certificates. The document, draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-08, is dated 2 November 2026 and began drawing wider attention after reaching the front page of Hacker News.

What the draft proposes

According to the draft's abstract, Merkle Tree certificates embed the kind of public, auditable certificate logging that Certificate Transparency provides today, rather than leaving it to a separate layer. The authors say the integrated design lowers logging costs at a moment when two trends are pushing them up: progressively shorter-lived certificates and the arrival of much larger post-quantum signature algorithms. They also claim the construction keeps security on par with today's combination of X.509 and Certificate Transparency, and they describe an optional optimization that eliminates signatures entirely, at the cost of working only for relying parties that are up to date and for older certificates.

The author list covers much of the ecosystem that would have to adopt such a system. David Benjamin (Google) and D. O'Brien (Apple) represent browser vendors whose products enforce certificate logging; B. E. Westerbaan and L. Valenta (Cloudflare) represent large-scale TLS deployment; Filippo Valsorda is listed at Geomys. The work runs inside the IETF's PKI, Logs, And Tree Signatures working group, whose acronym gives the drafts their "plants" name.

How the design is structured

A Merkle tree hashes a large batch of entries into a single root value, and the presence of any one entry can be proven with a short path of hashes rather than a per-entry signature. Certificate Transparency logs already use this structure; the draft brings the same idea into the issuance path itself.

The document's layout sketches the moving parts. A section on certification authorities defines issuance logs that record what a CA has issued, plus cosigners that countersign the resulting tree state, including signature formats and semantics. A section on certificates defines two formats: standalone certificates, and "landmark-relative" certificates that trade generality for size. Later sections specify how relying parties verify these certificates, which cosigners and subtrees they must trust, how revocation is expressed as revoked ranges, how the certificates are carried in TLS, and how ACME, the automated issuance protocol used by Let's Encrypt and many other CAs, would be extended to support them.

Why now: short-lived and post-quantum certificates

The abstract names its motivating pressures directly. Short-lived certificates are attractive because they shrink the window in which a stolen key or misissued certificate is useful, but they multiply issuance volume, and every issuance today means signatures and log submissions. Post-quantum schemes, meanwhile, would replace today's compact elliptic-curve signatures with far larger ones, inflating both handshake sizes and signing work. Aggregating many certificates under a single signed tree root attacks both problems at once, and the draft includes a dedicated section on size estimates.

Standard caveats apply

The document stresses its provisional nature: Internet-Drafts are works in progress, valid for at most six months, and may be updated, replaced or obsoleted at any time. This revision expires on 6 May 2027. Even if the working group converges, adoption would require coordinated changes across certificate authorities, web servers, TLS libraries and browsers, and the draft's deployment-considerations section explicitly weighs operational costs for CAs. Debate continues on the working group's mailing list, with the draft source and an issue tracker hosted on GitHub.

Why it matters

Certificate Transparency reshaped the certificate authority business by making misissuance publicly detectable, and browsers now treat logging as effectively mandatory. Merkle Tree certificates promise similar accountability at lower cost, which matters most exactly where today's costs bite: high-volume automated issuance of very short-lived certificates, and a future in which post-quantum signatures make every byte in a TLS handshake more expensive. The involvement of Google and Apple, whose browser enforcement made CT ubiquitous, plus Cloudflare's deployment reach, suggests this is more than an academic exercise. It remains only a draft, but it is a credible sketch of how the web PKI could issue and log certificates differently.

  • #tls
  • #pki
  • #ietf
  • #certificate-transparency
  • #post-quantum