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· via Hacker News – Front Page (native)

Optimizely supply chain attack served wallet-clipping and card-skimming scripts to major sites

Attackers exploited a flaw in Optimizely's Experimentation signup flow to inject JavaScript into customer projects, exposing visitors of CNN, BBC, Zoom and other sites to crypto-clipping, card skimming and iOS exploits.

Optimizely supply chain attack served wallet-clipping and card-skimming scripts to major sites

Attackers abused the Experimentation signup flow

Optimizely sells an experimentation and personalization platform whose JavaScript files are embedded directly into customers' web pages. According to BleepingComputer, the company confirmed that an unauthorized party found and abused a weakness in the account signup flow for its Experimentation product, using it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Because those scripts run inside customer pages, the injected code executed in the browsers of visitors to any affected site.

In its statement, Optimizely said it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, stripped the injected code from affected projects, terminated active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for impacted accounts. It also blocked delivery of the code through Cloudflare and notified affected customers, with further updates promised on its status page.

Dozens of well-known brands caught up

The incident came to light through security researcher Scott Helme, whose team examined 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found 188 infected files spread across 178 organizations. Using urlscan.io records, BleepingComputer independently verified that the malicious script loaded, or at least attempted to load, on pages belonging to Zoom, KLM, GitLab, the BBC, CNN, Scheels, American Girl, ManageBuilding, Smartsheet, Stamps.com and Salesforce. Fox News, Mutual of Omaha, American Eagle, Air France, Change.org, HSBC Insurance, Bitly, IG and UNICEF USA were also affected, as was Optimizely itself.

Salesforce told BleepingComputer it is investigating the modified scripts and has disabled Optimizely code across its preview and production environments as a precaution, promising to notify customers if it finds evidence of unauthorized data access.

A multi-stage payload

Analysis of the tampered files by BleepingComputer showed the injected code pulling in a second-stage script from a domain defanged as 1688360[.]cc. Some files referenced the address openly; others concealed it behind Base64 encoding decoded at runtime with atob(). Helme also spotted a variant that carried its own embedded copy of the payload and could run it if the remote fetch was blocked.

That second-stage script packed several capabilities:

  • Cryptocurrency clipping: it watches pages for wallet addresses and substitutes attacker-controlled ones, redirecting transfers.
  • Payment card skimming: it looks for card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into forms and sends them to an exfiltration endpoint on the same domain.
  • Mobile exploit delivery: it loads further JavaScript identified by Helme as the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, which target different versions of iOS.
  • General spying: it can also harvest browser cookies, page URLs and screenshots and pass them to the attackers.

Cleanup and unanswered questions

Helme found the wallets embedded in the malware had received roughly $7,000 in transactions as of November 16, though some predated the campaign, which muddies estimates of actual theft. Remediation moved quickly: by 21:52 UTC on November 16, only one of the 188 compromised files still contained malicious code, according to Helme. The earliest injection he observed dates to the early hours of November 16, but it remains unknown how long the vulnerability existed or how many visitors were exposed before the fix landed.

For people who browsed affected sites that day, BleepingComputer advises checking any cryptocurrency transfers to confirm the destination address was not swapped, monitoring card statements for unauthorized charges, updating iPhones and iPads to the latest iOS or iPadOS release, and staying alert for suspicious account activity, particularly on services that were logged in at the time.

Why it matters

The incident is a textbook demonstration of concentrated third-party risk. Optimizely sits on hundreds of high-traffic pages, so a single flaw in a signup form instantly distributed malware to news outlets, airlines, insurers and SaaS vendors simultaneously, with no per-site breach required. Every visitor to those pages ran attacker-controlled code with access to the page, its forms and its cookies. For engineering teams, it strengthens the case for subresource integrity, strict content security policies and ongoing review of third-party scripts. For everyone else, it is a reminder that the padlock in the address bar says nothing about the safety of the scripts a page loads.

  • #supply-chain
  • #security
  • #javascript
  • #malware
  • #saas

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