deniz.in

Markets

Weather

Loading weather

· via dev.to (home feed)

URL-encoding let ShinyHunters slip past WAF rules for CVE-2026-35273

Mandiant-documented ShinyHunters activity against Oracle PeopleTools used a percent-encoded path to bypass string-based WAF rules guarding the PSEMHUB servlet, a flaw NVD rates 9.8.

URL-encoding let ShinyHunters slip past WAF rules for CVE-2026-35273

What happened

Mandiant observed a renewed ShinyHunters campaign against CVE-2026-35273, a critical Oracle PeopleSoft flaw, in which attackers replaced the literal path segment /PSEMHUB/ with /%50SEMHUB/. The percent-encoded character decodes to the same letter at the application layer, so the request still reached the vulnerable PeopleSoft servlet, while web application firewalls relying on string-based path rules saw an unrecognized string and let it through.

As a dev.to analysis of the campaign puts it, the episode shows how a control can look correct in a policy yet fail in production, because the WAF and the application decode the same request at different points.

How the vulnerability works

CVE-2026-35273 affects Oracle PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools 8.61 and 8.62. Oracle shipped an out-of-band fix on 2026-06-10 for a flaw that can be exploited remotely without authentication and can lead to remote code execution. NVD records a CVSS 3.1 score of 9.8.

The Zero Day Initiative documented a chain that begins with server-side request forgery and ends at the Environment Management Hub. The Integration Gateway forwards a request to a destination of the attacker's choosing; when that destination is 127.0.0.1, the hub treats the connection as local because loopback appears in its allowed-host list. From there, the attacker can use administrative file operations to write a web shell or XML that the server processes through Java XMLDecoder.

The encoded path is not the root vulnerability, the write-up stresses. It is a delivery technique that stops a proxy rule from recognizing the sensitive route.

Impact

An attacker who reaches the hub can execute code under the PeopleSoft service account, which may have access to application files, database connection data and integrated systems. ShinyHunters used the access for data theft and extortion. The consequence for defenders is uncomfortable: a system protected only by a literal path block can remain exploitable even when the proxy reports that the vulnerable endpoint is blocked.

Scope and exposure

The analysis advises reviewing every PeopleTools 8.61 and 8.62 deployment that includes an Integration Gateway and Environment Management Hub, including internal application servers, since the first request can originate from an already compromised network position.

ZoomEye returned 3,298 matches for app="Oracle PeopleSoft" and zero for an exact CVE query during the review. Those product matches only show observable PeopleSoft interfaces; they do not prove that PSEMHUB is exposed or that any particular WAF rule is in place.

What to do now

The write-up recommends applying Oracle's Security Alert fix and treating WAF changes as a temporary reduction in reachability rather than a fix. Path checks should run after canonical decoding, and ambiguous encodings should be rejected when no legitimate integration requires them.

Additional steps include restricting administrative routes to trusted networks, separating the gateway's outbound request policy from ordinary user traffic, monitoring internal loopback requests to PSEMHUB and unusual gateway destinations, and reviewing WAF logs for the encoded path and related variants. Defenders should also account for percent-encoding, duplicate encoding, path normalization and routing differences among the WAF, reverse proxy and PeopleSoft application server.

Where an encoded request reached the application during the campaign period, the guidance is to investigate the host for a web shell, unexpected XML and service-account execution, preserve evidence before cleanup, and rotate credentials reachable from the PeopleSoft tier.

Why it matters

The campaign is a concrete demonstration that WAF rules matching raw strings can be defeated by trivial encoding variants, and that a proxy console reporting an endpoint as blocked does not mean the endpoint is unreachable. Patching and WAF hardening close different gaps, and both need verification. For teams running affected PeopleTools versions, the encoded-path log review is the immediate task; for everyone else, the broader lesson is to confirm where decoding happens relative to policy evaluation across the whole request path.

  • #security
  • #oracle-peoplesoft
  • #waf
  • #cve-2026-35273
  • #vulnerability-management

Related posts