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IOSCO warns banks and blockchains face slow, costly post-quantum cryptography migration

IOSCO's 63-page report says no quantum computer can break current encryption yet, but the post-quantum migration will take years, cost heavily and hit blockchains hardest.

IOSCO warns banks and blockchains face slow, costly post-quantum cryptography migration

Regulators sound the alarm

On November 19, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the global forum of securities regulators, published a 63-page report calling quantum computing a "significant medium to long-term cybersecurity challenge" for financial markets. A dev.to analysis of the report captures its core message: the financial world is unprepared, and the migration to post-quantum cryptography will take longer and cost more than the crypto industry generally assumes.

Notably, the report does not claim a quantum computer capable of breaking today's encryption exists — it states that none does. The concern is the migration itself: it will span years, most firms have barely started, and public blockchains, systems deliberately built to resist change, face the hardest transition of all.

Signatures grow 35-fold

An elliptic-curve signature on Bitcoin, Ethereum or Solana today is 64 bytes — the proof that a holder owns funds and authorizes each transaction. The post-quantum replacement, ML-DSA-44, produces signatures of roughly 2,420 bytes, 35 to 40 times larger, according to the dev.to analysis. On a blockchain, every byte is replicated to every node, stored indefinitely and paid for in fees, so multiplying signature size by 35 reshapes a network's economics. IOSCO cited an April Solana testnet experiment in which swapping in quantum-resistant signatures cut throughput by about 90 percent.

Why blockchains struggle most

A bank can, in principle, instruct its vendors to replace an algorithm. A public blockchain has no central authority: changing core cryptography means coordinating thousands of independent node operators, wallet developers, exchanges and users, many with little reason to move until forced. IOSCO warned that blockchain migration may be "slow and fragmented," naming Ethereum, Solana and Tron as examples, though the logic extends to any chain that signs with elliptic curves. The dev.to author also points to an unresolved dispute over funds left in addresses with exposed public keys: one camp argues they should be frozen or burned before a quantum computer can steal them, while the other insists nobody may stop holders from spending their own coins.

Solana is furthest along

According to the dev.to analysis, Solana has the most concrete plan, built on three parts: new signatures for users, a redesigned consensus system for validators, and a route for moving existing wallets over. It chose Falcon rather than ML-DSA for size — Falcon-512 signatures run 666 bytes, still ten times today's 64 but far below ML-DSA's 2,420 — and both of Solana's client teams, Anza and Jump Crypto's Firedancer, independently landed on the same choice. The Solana Foundation said in April that network performance is "not expected to see a meaningful impact" once migration activates, a claim that still needs proof.

Consensus is the harder problem. Solana switched on Alpenglow in October, targeting roughly 150-millisecond finality versus about 12.8 seconds, by bundling validator votes into compact aggregate signatures — and no post-quantum aggregate signature matches that efficiency. Anza researchers published Quantumglow in July, a redesign that strips out signatures wherever possible and leans on a hash-based scheme called Ax. Separately, the opt-in Winternitz Vault, introduced in January 2025, guards SOL with hash-based one-time signatures. None of this is live on mainnet yet.

Regulators are converging

IOSCO cited conservative estimates putting a cryptographically relevant quantum computer between 2030 and 2035, while several industry participants it consulted urged firms to prepare for one arriving within five years, potentially accelerated by AI. The disagreement is itself the problem: a 2035 arrival makes starting now look cautious, while a 2030 arrival makes it look late. Meanwhile, "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks mean data intercepted today — loan documents, merger records, private messages — can be decrypted once the machine exists; a German central banker illustrated a 14-year exposure window in the same week.

The UK's Bank of England, FCA and PRA issued joint guidance on the same day as the IOSCO report, telling firms to map vulnerable systems, draw up replacement plans and check suppliers. Hong Kong's HKMA did the same two weeks earlier, after scoring its banking sector 2.3 out of 10 on its own readiness index.

A new warning: "quantum washing"

The report also carries a caution the dev.to author had not previously seen from a regulator: "quantum washing," meaning vendors overstating what their quantum products can do. The warning exists because such claims already fill the market — a library implementing ML-KEM, or a press release about a pilot, does not make keys safe. Using a post-quantum algorithm in one corner of a system says little about whether the whole system would survive a capable quantum machine, and most of the industry has not closed that distance.

Why it matters

The report turns quantum risk from a speculative future event into a present-day budgeting and engineering problem. Because harvested data can be decrypted later, the effective deadline is not when a quantum computer arrives but how long each secret must stay secret, and IOSCO's 2030–2035 window leaves little slack. Banks face a multi-year cryptographic inventory and vendor overhaul that UK and Hong Kong regulators now explicitly demand. Blockchains face something structural: signature bloat that throttles throughput and raises fees, plus unresolved governance over funds that never migrate. The regulatory question has shifted from whether to prepare to why firms have not started.

  • #quantum-computing
  • #cryptography
  • #blockchain
  • #regulation
  • #security

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